Difference between revisions of "Superhuman AI for Multiplayer Poker"

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(Introduction)
(Introduction)
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For many years, most of the superhuman AI that were built can only beat human players in two-player zero-sum games. These games include checkers, chess, two-player limit poker, Go, and two-player no-limit poker. The most common strategy that the AI use to beat those games is to find the most optimal Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is the best possible choice that a player can take, regardless of what their opponent is going to choose. Nash equilibrium has been proven to always exists in all finite games, and the challenge is to find the equilibrium. To summarize, Nash equilibrium is the best possible strategy and is unbeatable in two-player zero-sum games, since it guarantees to not lose in expectation regardless what the opponent is doing.
 
For many years, most of the superhuman AI that were built can only beat human players in two-player zero-sum games. These games include checkers, chess, two-player limit poker, Go, and two-player no-limit poker. The most common strategy that the AI use to beat those games is to find the most optimal Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is the best possible choice that a player can take, regardless of what their opponent is going to choose. Nash equilibrium has been proven to always exists in all finite games, and the challenge is to find the equilibrium. To summarize, Nash equilibrium is the best possible strategy and is unbeatable in two-player zero-sum games, since it guarantees to not lose in expectation regardless what the opponent is doing.
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This means that developing a superhuman AI in a multiplayer setting is the remaining great milestone in this field. In this paper, the AI whom we call Pluribus, is capable of defeating human professional poker players in Texas hold'em poker which is a six-player poker game and is the most commonly played format in the world.
  
 
== Related Work ==
 
== Related Work ==

Revision as of 11:56, 14 November 2020

Presented by

Hansa Halim, Sanjana Rajendra Naik, Samka Marfua, Shawrupa Proshasty

Introduction

For many years, most of the superhuman AI that were built can only beat human players in two-player zero-sum games. These games include checkers, chess, two-player limit poker, Go, and two-player no-limit poker. The most common strategy that the AI use to beat those games is to find the most optimal Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is the best possible choice that a player can take, regardless of what their opponent is going to choose. Nash equilibrium has been proven to always exists in all finite games, and the challenge is to find the equilibrium. To summarize, Nash equilibrium is the best possible strategy and is unbeatable in two-player zero-sum games, since it guarantees to not lose in expectation regardless what the opponent is doing.

This means that developing a superhuman AI in a multiplayer setting is the remaining great milestone in this field. In this paper, the AI whom we call Pluribus, is capable of defeating human professional poker players in Texas hold'em poker which is a six-player poker game and is the most commonly played format in the world.

Related Work

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Theoretical Analysis

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Experimental Results

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Discussion

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Conclusion

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Critiques

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References

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